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Abstract:  
In 2002 the Government of Quebec enacted Bill 112, known as An Act to Combat 
Poverty and Social Exclusion. It has also instituted an advisory committee whose role is 
to advise the government on policies that may have a direct or indirect impact on poverty 
and social exclusion. The Committee published a series of recommendations in 2009 
that more or less amount to a Guaranteed Minimum Income scheme. We investigate the 
likely consequences of the recommendations on employment and income of all 
individuals residing in the Province of Quebec. We do this through the use of a 
behavioural micro-simulation model. Our results show that the proposed 
recommendations would have a large negative impact on hours of work and labor force 
participation – and mostly so among low-income workers. The recommendations would 
involve outlays in the order of $2.2 billion per year. 
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1 Introduction
The Government of Quebec has introduced over the past fifteen years a number of relatively novel
policies and initiatives with the specific objective of fighting poverty. One of the most visible such
initiatives has been the enactment in 2002 of Bill 112, known as An Act to Combat Poverty and
Social Exclusion. The Act is quite ambitious:
The object of this Act is to guide the Government of Québec and society as a whole
towards a process of planning and implementing actions to combat poverty, prevent its
causes, reduce its effects on individuals and families, counter social exclusion, and strive
towards a poverty-free Québec.
Such an Act is unique in North America; it also constitutes a significant political innovation, if only
because it makes poverty reduction an explicit and central policy priority. The Act also establishes
A National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion and provides for the creation of an
Anti-Poverty Fund (“Fonds québécois d’initiatives sociales”). It has further instituted an advisory
committee known as the CCLP (“Comité consultatif de lutte contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion so-
ciale”). The role of the CCLP is to advise the government on the planning, implementation and
assessment of actions taken within the scope of the National Strategy. The CCLP may also make
recommendations and give opinions on government policies that may have a direct or indirect impact
on poverty and social exclusion.
In this context, the CCLP published a report in 2009 containing a series of interesting and
important recommendations on the means of ensuring that all Quebecers have incomes that enable
them to meet their basic needs (Comité consultatif de lutte contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale
2009). Two of these recommendations will be the focus of the present paper. They are singled out
because they naturally lend themselves to analytical investigation and also because together they
broadly amount to establishing a guaranteed minimum income.
As stressed in its Policy Statement (Gouvernement du Québec 2002), the Government of Quebec
considers employment to be the primary road to independence and often the best way to combat
poverty. The CCLP report and the government’s statement are not entirely incompatible but they
are reminiscent of the debate on the competing objectives of providing sufficient income support to
escape from material poverty while making work sufficiently attractive. Although social assistance
typically provides low benefits (often insufficient to escape material poverty by most standards), in
some circumstances it can represent an attractive alternative to low-paid work, especially for families
with children. Longer-term receipt of social assistance can also reinforce poverty by deteriorating
recipients’ employment skills and by lowering their aspirations and morale. Parental use of social
assistance can further increases the probability that their children will eventually be recipients (see
Beaulieu et al. 2005 for evidence for Quebec). As stated by the Ontario Task Force on Income
Security states, “[a] modern income security system would expect and encourage individuals to
assume personal responsibility for taking advantage of opportunities for engagement in the workforce
or in community life.” (Task Force on Modernizing Income Security for Working-Age Adults 2006,
p.16)
One common “modernizing” proposal has been to add earnings supplements to existing social
assistance programs. Often known as “in-work benefits,” such income supplements have become
major policy tools in a number of countries, including the United States (where it is known as the
Earned Income Tax Credit), the United Kingdom (the Working Tax Credit) and France (Prime pour
l’emploi). In Canada, a Working Income Tax Benefit (WITB) was introduced in March 2007. It is a
relatively modest refundable tax credit set to 20% of earned income-up to $500 for individuals and
$1,000 for families and is reduced by 15% of net income for individuals earning more than $9,500
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and families earning more than $14,500. The WITB aims at improving the incentives to work for
low-income Canadians and to lower the so-called “welfare wall”. A different Canadian example is
the proposal by Task Force on Modernizing Income Security for Working-Age Adults (2006) — also
supported by Saunders (2005) — of offering a combination of a Basic Refundable Tax Credit and
of a Working Income Benefit to all low-income working-age adults. This combination would offer
a maximum benefit of around $4,000 per year, which would begin to be clawed back at an income
level of around $5,000 per year and would be reduced to zero at income of $21,000 per year. The
benefit would not be available to those without earnings.
An alternative formulation consists of a Basic Income, which can also be considered to be a form
of negative income taxation. A key issue is the marginal tax rates that should apply to different
implicit and explicit income tax brackets and, more particularly, whether these rates should increase
or decrease with income. The Basic Income scenarios envisaged in Araar et al. (2005) broadly favor
a constant marginal tax rate and, therefore, a flat tax system (see Kesselman 2000).
Yet another alternative approach is that of a Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). As mentioned
above, it has been recently proposed by Quebec’s CCLP through the following two propositions (see
recommendations 2 and 13 in Comité consultatif de lutte contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale
2009):
Recommendation 1 The CCLP recommends that, as a first step, baseline financial support be set
at 80% of (Statistics Canada’s) Market Basket Measure for disposable income in municipalities
with a population of fewer than 30,000 inhabitants.
Recommendation 2 The CCLP recommends that individuals who work an average of 16 weekly
hours at the minimum wage have a disposable income that is no lower than the above Market
Basket Measure for disposable income in municipalities with a population of fewer than 30,000
inhabitants.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the likely impact of the above GMI recommendations
on the employment and income of individuals residing in the Province of Quebec. We do this through
the use of a behavioral micro-simulation model. We first model the labor supply of a representative
sample of the population using a discrete choice model and individual budget constraints that are
based on the existing tax code. We next modify the budget constraints in accordance with the above
recommendations. Based on the model’s parameter estimates, we then simulate their likely longer
term impact on employment and earnings. Our results show that the proposed recommendations
would have a large negative impact on hours of work and labor force participation — and mostly so
among low-income workers, in all likelihood an unintended consequence. Finally, the recommenda-
tions would be rather costly. They would amount to greater outlays of the order of $ 2.2 billion per
year, of which 85% would be borne by the provincial government.
2 Data and Economic Setting
Our analysis uses data primarily drawn from Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database
(SPSD/M) for 2004. SPSD/M provides a statistically representative database of individuals in
their family context, with enough information on each individual to compute taxes paid to and cash
transfers received from governments. The main component of the database is the Survey of Labour
and Income Dynamics (SLID). Important variables that are unavailable in the SLID are imputed
by Statistics Canada using the Survey of Household Spending (SHS) and administrative data. For
the specific purposes of this study, additional variables such the net value of residence, the value of
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financial assets and the net worth of the vehicles owned have also been imputed using the Survey
of Financial Security of 2005 and Census data for 2001.1
2.1 Sample Characteristics
Our sample omits individuals under age 18 and over 65 as well as full-time students and the disabled.
Individuals reporting earnings from self-employment and those working on average more than 70
hours per week are also excluded from the sample. Overall the sample consists of 3,031 individuals.
The labor supply model is estimated for three distinct sub-groups: single men, single women, and
single mothers.2 Table 1 shows the breakdown by age groups along with their total sample weights.
Total census weights for the same groups are also included to assess the representativeness of our
sample. Single women and single mothers are somewhat under-represented in our sample, whereas
the opposite holds for single men. The discrepancies are partly attributable to relatively small sample
sizes but also to the fact that exclusion restrictions identical to those applied for our sample could
not be applied to the census data when using census weights.
Table 1: Sample sizes and weights
Group <30 years >30 years Total Total sample Total census
weight weight
Single men 563 1 246 1 809 385 962 327 246
Single women 214 617 831 265 469 291 841
Single mothers 38 353 391 100 669 186 966
Total 752 100 806 053
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on key variables included in the econometric model. The
patterns reported in the table are roughly consistent with those found in the census data. Thus,
single men are on average younger than both single women and single mothers. In addition, they
tend to work more and earn a higher hourly wage rate. As a consequence, their earnings are also
higher than those of the other groups. Finally, the table shows that single mothers have on average
1.72 children and 18% have preschoolers.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Single men Single women Single mothers
Mean Std-dev Mean Std-dev Mean Std-dev
Age 38.08 11.23 43.12 13.29 40.96 8.13
Weekly hours of work 34.51 13.70 27.53 15.73 28.02 14.86
Earnings ($1000) 43.42 66.23 23.42 34.86 21.45 16.84
Non-labor earnings ($1000) 4.39 32.60 3.57 10.01 3.01 4.86
Hourly wage rate ($) 16.51 5.14 14.50 4.09 14.75 3.99
# Children 0–18 1.72 0.95
Have preschool children 0.18 0.38
2.2 Fiscal Environment
In order to understand the likely impact of the CCLP’s proposals, it is useful to depict graphically
their impact on the net earnings of various individual configurations. Figures 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) plot
the yearly earnings of single males, single females and single mothers separately. All three figures
1The details of the imputations are not presented for the sake of brevity but are available upon request.
2Single fathers are not included because there are too few of them in the sample.
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are sketched under the assumption that the individual earns the minimum wage since these are the
individuals likely to be most affected by the proposals. The budget constraints are computed using
the Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator (CTaCS) developped by Milligan (2008). CTaCS simulates
the Canadian personal income tax and transfer system (provincial and federal). The program was
slightly modified to take into account Quebec’s 2004 welfare benefit system (Gouvernement du
Québec 2004).3 Note that we assume that the CCLP benefits would not be taxable at the federal
level or at the provincial level, and that no Employment Insurance or Quebec Pension Plan premia
would be levied against the benefits.
Figure 1(a) focuses on single men and women. The budget set is identical for both groups
because it is drawn under the same assumptions (minimum wage, no assets, etc.). Notice first that
inactive individuals would gain under the CCLP proposals. Indeed, they would receive a transfer
equivalent to 80% of the Market Basket Measure which is substantially more than the welfare
benefits that prevailed in 2004. As they start working, their net earnings increase very slowly because
the government transfer decreases proportionately. As they reach 16 hours per week, workers face
an implicit tax rate of 100%. Beyond 32 weekly hours of work they are no longer entitled to the
transfer and then face the standard tax system. Under the existing system, net earnings increase
faster than under the CCLP proposals at first due to the earnings disregard in the determination of
welfare benefits. A plateau is reached as early as 7 hours of work per week because welfare benefits
are taxed at an implicit rate of 100% beyond the corresponding earnings.
Figure 1(a) also plots the (smoothed) distribution of weekly hours of work using data from the
SPSD/M database (right-hand side scale). In both cases there is considerable bunching around 40
hours per week. Yet proportionately more men work beyond 40 hours and fewer are inactive. The
figure highlights the fact that the majority of singles would have a strong incentive to reduce their
hours of work. Even those whose earnings are higher than the cut-off point, they still could prefer
to work less and earn just slightly less than they currently do.
Figures 1(b) and 1(c) depict the budget sets and the distribution of weekly hours of work of single
mothers under two different assumptions with respect to net assets. Figure 1(b) focuses on single
mothers with median-level net assets and minimum wage rate. Under the current welfare regime
their monthly benefits are relatively low because they are means-tested. Under the CCLP regime
single mothers would enjoy a considerable increase in earnings. Figure 1(c) is sketched under the
assumption that single mothers have no assets. The CCLP recommendations would not improve
their situation since the existing welfare system is already more generous than the proposed CCLP
benefits.
To gain a better understanding of the implicit incentive effects in both the CCLP and the status
quoworlds, Figure 2 sketches the net hourly wage rate a single female at the gross minimum wage
and with no assets would enjoy as she increases her weekly hours of work. In the current world,
the income disregard in the welfare system ensures a recipient’s earning are not taxed away at low
hours of work. She thus enjoys a net wage rate of $7.45/hour. As her earnings increase beyond the
disregard, every additional dollar of earnings decreases her welfare benefits by one dollar. She thus
earns a net wage rate of $0/hour. Once her earnings completely exhaust her benefits, she starts
paying income taxes and thus enjoys a net wage rate of about $6/hour. Finally, as her earnings
increase beyond the first income tax bracket, she starts paying yet more taxes and works for a net
wage rate of about $5 hour as a result.
In the CCLP world, the first hour of work increases earnings by as little as $2.91 because the
3Welfare benefits are means tested. As stated earlier, a number of variables need to be imputed in order to
determine potential welfare benefits. These include the net property value (home and car) and net value of financial
assets. They are imputed based on auxiliary regressions applied to Statistics Canada’s 2005 Survey of Financial
Security of 2005.
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(a) Single Males and Females With No Assets
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Figure 1: Budget Sets for Singles and Single Mothers, with and without CCLP benefits
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Figure 2: Net Hourly Wage Rate, Minimum Wage Worker, No Assets
transfer received from the government decreases linearly between 80% of the MBM at zero hours
of work and 100% of the MBM at 16 hours of work. Consequently, as she reaches 16 hours of work
per week, a single female receives a net wage rate of $0/hour. Only once she reaches 32 hours per
week is her net wage rate again positive. This is because her earnings at 32 hours per week are just
equal to 100% of the MBM. Working an additional hour of work will bring her beyond the threshold
and she will no longer receive any transfer. Her earnings will be large enough for her to pay income
taxes.
The CCLP proposals do not remove the “welfare trap” per se. They simply shift it rightwardly and
consequently significantly changes the incentive effects at low hours of work. The likely impact of
the CCLP proposals on the distribution of hours of work cannot be ascertained easily. To do this,
we must turn to formal modeling.
3 Econometric Model
In order to conduct coherent policy simulations, the labor supply model must investigate individual
behavior in a theoretically consistent manner.4 Unfortunately, the highly non-linear (and often non-
convex) budget constraints make that task particularly demanding if we treat hours of work as a
continuous choice variable. To ease the task, it is often customary to follow Soest and Das (2001)
and focus on a discrete number of weekly hours of work. Thus, let the choice set facing an individual
be given by {h1, h2,. . . , hp}, where p is the number of possible choices of hours of work. Individuals
are assumed to maximize a well-behaved utility function defined over leisure, l , and net income, y ,
with respect to time and income constraints:
max U i(l i , y i) s.t. y i ≤ y i(l i , w) and l i ≤ T, (1)
4In particular, the Slutsky restrictions must be satisfied.
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where i corresponds to a given level of leisure. Hours of leisure, (l i = T − hi), are given by the time
endowment, T , from which we subtract hours of work, hi . We fix T = 80 hours per week.5 Net
income equals earnings, whi , plus exogenous non-labor income, N, and government transfers, B,
less income taxes, T (Keane and Moffitt 1998):
y i(hi) = whi + N + B(whi , N,X)− T (whi , N,X), (2)
where X is a vector of demographic variables.
We use a translog utility function because of its useful properties and well-known flexibility. It is
defined as:
ui(l i , y i) = β1 log(l
i) + β2 log(l
i)2 + β3 log(y
i) + β4log(y
i)2. (3)
In particular, this utility function is locally flexible to the second order and does not impose the
quasi-concavity of preferences.6 As is customary, preference heterogeneity is introduced in the
leisure parameter β1:
β1 = α0 + α1 log(Age) + α2 log(Age)
2 + α3NB018 + α4(Preschool > 0) + υ, (4)
where A is age, NB018 is the number of children below 18, and (Preschool > 0) is a dummy variable
equal to one when a preschooler is present in the household. Preference for leisure also varies with
unobserved characteristics, υ, random component. The letter is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed as a normal random variate with mean zero and variance σ2.
To allow for optimization errors, we also assume that the utility function itself has a random term
ξi :
U i(l i , y i) = ui(l i , y i) + ξi . (5)
This assumption is made to allow for the possibility that individuals may not know their utility levels
perfectly, or for the fact that their optimal choice of labor supply may not correspond exactly to the
discrete choices we model. For the purpose of identification, ξi is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed as a Type-I extreme value random variate (namely, the Gumble distribution).
According to equation (1), an individual will choose hi if ui is greater than the utility associated
with the other alternatives. Given the stochastic specification of the model, the probability this will
happen, conditional on a given value of υ, is given by:
Pr
[
ui ≥ uj ∀ j] = exp (ui (l i , y i) |υ)∑p
j=1 exp (u
j (l j , y j) |υ) . (6)
The literature on discrete labor supply models has generally found that such models tend to
underpredict the number of individuals with h = 0. This will occur if the “fixed costs” associated
with work are omitted from the analysis. For instance, Cogan (1981) insisted early on that both the
monetary costs (commuting, daycare, etc.) and non-monetary costs (psychic costs, stress, etc.)
be accounted for explicitly in labor supply models. Obviously, many of these costs are difficult to
observe but may be proxied by demographic variables. Fixed costs must be subtracted from income
if h > 0. The problem with this is that income minus fixed costs may be negative, a possibility
that cannot be dealt with due to the form of the translog utility function. Gong and van Soest
(2002) have introduced the notion of fixed income for not working. Instead of subtracting a fixed
cost to work, a fixed income can be added to the income at zero hours of work, making inactivity a
5According to Gong and van Soest (2002), the parameter estimates are relatively insensitive to this particular
normalization.
6The marginal utility of income must be positive for the model to be theoretically consistent (see Soest and Das
2001).
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relatively more attractive alternative. Both approaches have the potential to capture the bunching
at zero hours of work. For practical reasons, the model for single mothers is based upon the “fixed
costs” approach, while the models for single males and females are based upon the “fixed income”
approach.7
Fixed incomes and fixed costs are incorporated into the model by replacing u
(
y i , l i
)
by u
(
y0 + F I, l0
)
and u
(
y i − FC, l i) , ∀i > 0, respectively. The precise specification is
F I = γ0 + γ1 ln (A) (7)
FC = δ0 + δ1(P reschool > 0). (8)
Equation (7) assumes that the fixed income is related to age and equation (8) states that the
fixed costs of working are associated with the presence of preschoolers. The two specifications could
be made to depend on a richer set of covariates. To save on the degrees of freedom, the most
parsimonious specification that nevertheless fitted the data well was, however, selected.
We make one last modification to the standard model to account for the bunching of weekly
hours of work around 40. We thus write:
U i(l i , y i) = ui(l i , y i) + θ(h = 40), (9)
where (h = 40) is a dummy indicator equal to one if the individual works exactly 40 hours per week.
The parameter λ proxies a fixed effect that increases the utility associated with working forty hours
per week.
Finally, note that equation (6) is written conditionally on a given realization of the random
component υ. The unconditional probability is obtained by integrating it out:
Pr
[
ui ≥ uj ∀ j] = ∫ exp (ui (l i , y i) |υ)∑p
j=1 exp (u
j (l j , y j) |υ)φ
(
υ; 0, σ2
)
dυ, (10)
where φ is the density of υ. Because υ is assumed to follow a normal distribution, equation (10)
does not have a closed-form solution. We thus simulate the integration by drawing R = 100 draws
of υq, q = 1, ..., R, from the normal distribution for each observations and compute the expected
probability (10) as:
P̂r
[
ui ≥ uj ∀ j] = 1
R
R∑
q=1
exp
(
ui
(
l i , y i
) |υq)∑p
j=1 exp (u
j (l j , y j) |υq) . (11)
The maximization of the simulated likelihood function yields consistent and efficient parameter
estimates if
√
N/R → 0 when R → +∞ and N → +∞ (N being the number of observations; see
Gouriéroux and Monfort 1991; 1996).8
4 Estimation and Simulation Results
The model in equation (10) is estimated for single males, single females and single mothers separately
by the method of simulated maximum likelihood. All three models converged very rapidly. We first
look at how the parameter estimates fare relative to the economic theory of utility maximization
under budget constraints. Conditional on the parameters satisfying basic theoretical requirements,
we next focus on simulating the CCLP proposals.
7Both approaches were in fact used for all groups. The specifications chosen offered the best fit.
8The literature suggests that R = 20 appears quite adequate (see Laroque and Salanié 1993, Kamionka 1998).
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4.1 Estimation Results
The parameter estimates of the labor supply models are presented in Table 3. The parameters
for the three samples are compatible with the quasi-concavity of the preferences either globally or
locally9: 100 % of single males and females, and 94.37 % of single mothers. Furthermore, net
income is found to be a normal good for 100% of single females, 98.19% of single mothers, and
96.47% of single males.10 It thus appears that, for the majority of the individuals in our sample,
hours of work can legitimately be represented as the outcome of the maximization of preferences
under a budget constraint.
The parameter estimates of the fixed income term also tell an interesting story. Indeed, the
parameter associated with log(Age) is positive for both single males and females and is highly
statistically significant. Older singles thus behave as though they have a more marked preference
for leisure. Likewise, the parameter associated with (h = 40) is also positive and highly statistically
significant. In our framework this is equivalent to depicting a strong preference for working the
standard workweek.
The parameters of the fixed costs term are also intuitively consistent. Recall that the fixed cost is
subtracted from net earnings conditional on working. The parameter estimates show that the fixed
cost to work increases when preschoolers are present in the household. They thus make working
a less attractive alternative. Single mothers, like single males and females, also behave as though
they have a strong preference for the standard workweek (θ).
As a final check on the overall fit of the model, we report observed and predicted distributions
of hours of work for the three samples separately in Table 4. For each individual we compute the
budget constraint based upon his/her characteristics.11 Next, we compute the utility associated
with each discrete point of his/her budget constraint.12 The discrete point that yields the highest
utility level is then selected. The table shows that the model does a good job at predicting observed
outcomes. Indeed, the differences between observed and predicted choices are small for each sample.
In particular, the fit at zero [0,4[ and at [36,44[ ([35,45[) is almost perfect. Since the parameter
estimates of the three samples are consistent with a priori expectations and since nearly all individuals
behave consistently with basic economic theory, we proceed to simulate with some confidence the
expected impact of the CCLP proposals.
4.2 Simulation Results
The simulation of the CCLP proposals follows the same strategy as that outlined in the previous
section. The individual budget constraints are computed in accordance with the proposals and based
upon individual characteristics using CTaCS. Net income is computed for each discrete point of the
budget constraint. Next, the utility level of each point is computed and the one that yields the
highest utility level is selected (taking into account the distribution of the different random terms).
The results of this process are reported in Tables 5–7. The three tables are arranged similarly.
Row-wise they report the distribution of hours as observed in 2004 (status quo). Column-wise they
report the distribution that would result following the implementation of the CCLP proposals. The
matrices thus decompose the total changes in the hours distribution into its different components.
The numbers that appear above the diagonal correspond to an increase in weekly hours of work
9Our specification is such that the preferences are quasi-concave whenever ul lu2y + uyyu2l < 0.
10Net income is normal if ul luy < 0.
11Age, hourly wage rate, net assets, etc.
12The number of discrete points differ between samples to reflect the empirical distribution of weekly hours of work
and to ensure there are enough sample points at each.
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following the implementation of the CCLP proposals, whereas the converse holds for numbers
appearing below the diagonal.
Table 5 focuses on single men. Comparing the diagonal elements with the rightmost column
reveals a single major change in the hours distribution: The share of workers reporting between 36
and 44 hours per week would decrease from 56.25% (rightmost column) to 39.93% (diagonal) were
the CCLP recommendations implemented.13 This decrease in full-time work would translate into
a larger share of non-participation (+12,45%) and an increase in the [4,12[ bracket (+3.52%). No
numbers are reported above the diagonal of the matrix. Not surprisingly, the CCLP recommendations
offer little incentive to increase weekly hours of work.
Table 6 reports the simulation results for single women. The results are very similar to those of
single men except for the fact that the changes in the hours of work distribution is more evenly
spread out. The increases in the [0,4[ and [4,12[ brackets (+15.93% and +3.91%, respectively) are
associated to decreases in the [28,36[ and [36,44[ brackets (-4.78% and -10.85%, respectively).
Just as in the previous table, no numbers are reported above the diagonal, and thus the CCLP
recommendations are predicted not to have a positive impact on the labor supply of single females.
Finally, the simulations results for single mothers are reported in Table 7. Recall from our previous
discussion that only those single mothers who have positive assets are expected to react to the CCLP
proposals.14 According to Figure 1(c), single mothers who are not working have a stronger incentive
to remain off the labor market under CCLP. Likewise, those who are active have an incentive to
decrease their labor supply.
The simulation results in Table 7 are consistent with this conjecture. The changes in the hours
distribution are small and none is statistically significant, save for the [35,45[ bracket. For the [35,45[
bracket, the share of full-time work is predicted to decrease by 3.21 percentage points, much less
than what is predicted for single males and females. This is because ??? a toi Guy ??? few single
mothers (COMBIEN NICHOLAS-JAMES : 80810 (324 obs ou 80%) mere monoparentales ont des
actifs nets positifs, mais seulement 45346 (209 obs ou 45%) se voient reduirent leur prestations
d’aide sociale Il est a noter que les revenus d’aide sociale ne sont qu’un partie des transfert qui sont
verse aux femmes et que la valeur du d’aide sociale represente en moyenne 60% du revenu net de
celle-ci. 37679 ( 154 obs ou 37%) des femmes monoparentales recoivent une subvention du cclp
superieure a 100$ par annee. Les femmes recevant des subventions ne sont pas exclusivement des
femmes avec des actifs positifs mais elles restent la majorite des cas.)??? have positive net assets,
and among those who do, their value is small enough so that it does not decrease substantially their
welfare benefits.
The previous tables described the overall expected impact of the proposed recommendations on
the distribution of hours of work. The response to the proposals is likely to vary with net earnings.
Table 8 reports the impact of the recommendations on the expected weekly hours of work with
respect to percentiles of net earnings. It also distinguishes between the intensive margin, i.e. the
impact on hours of work conditionally on working, and the extensive margin, i.e. the impact on
participation per se. The table reveals a number of interesting results. To start with, most of the
behavioral adjustments occur at the extensive margin, as shown in the first column. This was already
found in Tables 5–7. These results are entirely consistent with the recent literature on income taxes
and labor supply (see, e.g., Blundell 2000, Eissa and Hoynes 2006, Meyer 2002). Thus, conditional
on working, individuals decrease their weekly hours of work little. Many choose, however, to stop
working altogether. This response varies greatly with net earnings. From Table 8, individuals in the
bottom 10 or 25 percentiles react most in percentage terms, while those in the upper percentiles
13Most estimates are statistically significant. To avoid cluttering the table, we only indicate those that are not
statistically significant at the 10% threshold.
14Again, this is because those without assets would be made worse off by the proposals.
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react little, especially at the intensive margin. All adjustments at both the intensive and extensive
margins are statistically different from zero in the upper percentiles.
All in all, our simulation results show that single males and females would react strongly to the
CCLP proposals. Furthermore, our simulations also show that those that would respond most are
those that have the lowest current earnings. The sharp decreases in participation rates and ensuing
decreases in income taxes, coupled with sizable outlays, may make the CCLP proposals costly. We
now turn to this issue.
4.3 The Cost of the CCLP Proposals
In addition to the CCLP benefits per se, the CCLP costs to the federal and provincial governments
must take into account changes in income taxes, transfers, social assistance benefits, Quebec
Pension Plan and Employment Insurance premiums, etc. These changes are computed under two
different scenarios. In the first, the conservative scenario, we assume that the labor supply response
following the implementation of the CCLP proposals is zero. In the second, the behavioral scenario,
we allow for such a response. In both cases, we start by computing the taxes and transfers of
each individual in our sample based on their observed labor supply. We next modify the budget
constraints according to the CCLP recommendations and compute the taxes and transfers again.
The differences are then multiplied by the individual sample weights to obtain an aggregate estimate
of the cost of the scenarios.
Table 9 reports the costs associated with both scenarios. The upper-half panel concerns the
“conservative” scenario. Recall that we assume that the CCLP benefits would not be taxable at the
federal level and at the provincial level, and that no Employment Insurance or Quebec Pension Plan
premia would be levied against those benefits.15 In the case in which federal taxes would be levied
against the CCLP benefits, the latter would have to be increased so that the net income accruing
to the individual would meet the CCLP income objectives. Those additional CCLP expenses would
represent an additional cost for the provincial government and additional revenues for the federal
government. From an overall fiscal point of view, the overall cost of the CCLP recommendations
would, however, not be altered were the benefits to be taxed at the federal level.
The upper panel of Table 9 represents the additional cost the provincial government would have
to bear in order to meet the CCLP recommendations. The amounts are in addition to the stan-
dard welfare benefits. Many more individuals would receive CCLP benefits than there are welfare
recipients. Consequently, the additional amounts are fairly sizable. The per capita cost of the
recommendations would vary between $500 and $600 per year, and are slightly larger for single
women.
The lower panel of the table reports the results of the behavioral scenario. Federal and provincial
income taxes decrease because many individual decrease their labor supply in response to the CCLP
benefits. Social assistance payments increase for the same reason: Those who reduce their hours
of work substantially or completely often become entitled to welfare benefits. The CCLP payments
thus correspond to the additional outlays the government must bear to meet the requirements of the
CCLP recommendations. They are larger than in the “conservative” scenario because many individ-
uals are expected to decrease their labor supply sufficiently to qualify for the benefits. The overall
cost of the recommendations is predicted to be important: approximately $2,870 per individual,
which is more than four times the per capita cost of the non-behavioral scenario. The total CCLP
costs would then be of the order of $2.2 billion, 85% of which would be borne by the provincial
15Because of this, the CCLP benefits correspond to the amount over and above standard welfare benefits that are
needed to meet the Market Basket Measure objectives.
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government. The remaining $331 million would be borne by the federal government, $286 million
of which through a fall in personal income tax revenue.
5 Conclusion
Guaranteed minimum income schemes are often proposed as a means to help escaping from poverty.
These schemes can, however, generate important work disincentives. The paper focuses on one par-
ticular scheme that was recently proposed by Quebec’s Comité consultatif de lutte contre la pauvreté
et l’exclusion sociale. Under the proposed GMI, every inactive individual would be guaranteed an
income equivalent to 80% of the Market Basket Measure. Workers with earnings at least equivalent
to 16 weekly hours paid at the minimum wage would be entitled to 100% of the Market Basket
Measure.
To assess the potential impact of the proposed GMI, we first estimate a structural labor supply
model using the existing tax code and a representative sample of the population of Quebec. We
next simulate the impact of the GMI proposals by modifying the budget sets accordingly and by
predicting the labor supply of our representative sample of individuals based upon the parameter
estimates of the labor supply model. Our results show that the proposed GMI would have strong
negative impacts on labor market participation rates, and mostly so among low wage workers. In
a world without labor market adjustments, the scheme is estimated to cost approximately $ 460
million. When labor supply effects are accounted for, the cost increases to well above $ 2 billion,
due to GMI’s effects on transfers and forgone taxes at the provincial and federal levels.
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6 Parameter Estimates
Table 3: Parameter Estimates of the Labor Supply Models
Variable Est StdErr Est StdErr Est StdErr
Single Men Single Women Single Mothers
ln(Leisure) 102.25 24.02 203.47 41.27 228.51 97.18
ln(Leisure)2 1.32 0.8 -2.47 1.56 -3.93 1.40
ln(Leisure)× ln(Age) -59.29 12.92 -100.66 20.07 -112.39 51.12
ln(Leisure)× ln(Age)2 8.09 1.8 14.04 2.75 16.06 6.98
ln(Leisure)×NB018 0.44 0.41
ln(Leisure)×(Preschool >0) 0.47 0.91
ln(Net income) 4.22 0.39 4.27 1.03 -1.27 0.93
ln(Net income)2 0.018 0.02 0.058 0.03 0.89 0.28
40h/week (θ) 2.02 0.13 1.9 0.18 1.34 0.26
Fixed Income (FI)
Constant (γ0) -36.85 6.51 -32.84 11.4
log(Age) (γ1) 12.20 1.99 11.4 3.67
Fixed Costs (FC)
Constant (δ0) 5.57 0.30
Preschool > 0 (δ1) 6.78 2.84
Table 4: Observed and Predicted Distributions of Weekly Hours of Work (%)
Single Men Single Women Single Mothers
Hours Obs Pred Diff Hours Obs Pred Diff Hours Obs Pred Diff
[0, 4[ 11.64 11.45 -0.19 [0, 4[ 25.54 23.88 -2.0 [0, 5[ 16.27 14.84 -1.43
[4, 12[ 2.1 2.45 0.35 [4, 12[ 1.6 4.27 1.98 [5, 15[ 5.85 6.38 0.53
[12, 20[ 3.97 4.29 0.32 [12, 20[ 4.68 4.98 0.61 [15, 25[ 6.67 10.66 3.98
[20, 28[ 6.07 7.08 1.01 [20, 28[ 6.67 5.56 1.87 [25, 35[ 18.47 14.93 -3.55
[28, 36[ 11.03 8.16 -2.88 [28, 36[ 12.48 12.5 -3.07 [35, 45[ 48.46 48.44 0.0
[36, 44[ 56.25 56.24 0.0 [36, 44[ 46.48 46.48 0.0 [45, 55[ 4.29 4.75 0.46
[44, 52[ 3.65 5.95 2.3 [44, 52[ 2.54 2.68 0.61
[52, 60[ 5.28 4.36 -0.92
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Table 5: Transition Matrix of Weekly Hours of Work, Single Men, With and Without GMI (%)
Without With GMI Total
GMI [0, 4[ [4, 12[ [12, 20[ [20, 28[ [28, 36[ [36, 44[ [44, 52[ [52, 60[
[0, 4[ 11.64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.64
[4, 12[ 0.04 2.07 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.11
[12, 20[ 0.32 0.04 3.61 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.97
[20, 28[ 1.02 0.14 0.05 4.86 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.07
[28, 36[ 1.36 0.47 0.01 0.0 8.29 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.13
[36, 44[ 12.45 3.52 0.35 0.0 0.0 39.93 0.0 0.0 56.25
[44, 52[ 1.06 0.1 0.03 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.46 0.0 3.65
[52, 60[ 1.16 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 5.28
Total 29.05 6.36 4.05 4.86 8.29 39.93 2.46 4.1 100.00
Change 17.41 4.25 0.08† -1.21 -1.84 -16.32 -1.19† -1.18†
† The change is not statistically different from 0 at a 10% level.
Table 6: Transition Matrix of Weekly Hours of Work, Single Women, With and Without GMI (%)
Without With GMI Total
GMI [0, 4[ [4, 12[ [12, 20[ [20, 28[ [28, 36[ [36, 44[ [44, 52[
[0, 4[ 25.52 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.54
[4, 12[ 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.60
[12, 20[ 1.11 0.0 3.57 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.68
[20, 28[ 1.16 0.2 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.67
[28, 36[ 4.3 0.48 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 12.48
[36, 44[ 9.02 1.47 0.36 0.0 0.0 35.63 0.0 46.48
[44, 52[ 0.36 0.15 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.03 2.54
Total 41.48 3.91 3.95 5.3 7.7 35.63 2.03 100.00
Change 15.93 2.31 -0.73 † -1.37 -4.78 -10.85 -0.51
† The change is not statistically different from 0 at a 10% level.
Table 7: Transition Matrix of Weekly Hours of Work, Single Mothers, With and Without GMI (%)
Without With GMI Total
GMI [0, 5[ [5, 15[ [15, 25[ [25, 35[ [35, 45[ [45, 55[
[0, 5[ 16.25 0.02 0.06 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.32
[5, 15[ 0.0 4.69 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.69
[15, 25[ 0.13 0.03 5.87 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.03
[25, 35[ 0.47 0.2 0.24 21.18 0.0 0.0 22.10
[35, 45[ 1.48 0.83 0.78 0.11 43.09 0.0 46.30
[45, 55[ 0.08 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.40 4.54
Total 18.42 5.83 6.95 21.29 43.09 4.40 100.0
Change 2.10† 1.13† 0.92† -0.81† -3.21 -0.14†
† The change is not statistically different from 0 at a 10% level.
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Table 8: Simulated Impact of the GMI Recommendations on Hours of Work, by Ranges of Net
Earnings Percentiles
Total 0–10 0–25 75-100 90–100
% Change, Intensive Margin
Single males -4.97 %*** -20.32 %*** -14.83 %*** -0.43 %*** -0.25 %***
Single females -5.07 %*** -19.71 %*** -15.97 %*** -1.04 %*** -0.36 %***
Single mothers -2.90 %*** -1.43 %** -2.47 %** -2.55 %*** -0.63 %***
% Change, Extensive Margin
Single males -21.01 %** -40.13 %*** -34.17 %*** -7.76 %*** -6.75 %***
Single females -16.70 %** -24.48 %*** -24.58 %*** -9.90 %*** -6.35 %***
Single mothers -3.08 %*** 0.20 % -2.72 %*** -2.89 %** -2.12 %***
% Change, Total
Single males -21.67 %*** -44.81 %** -39.41 %** -8.19 %** -7.00 %**
Single females -20.85 %*** -41.92 %** -39.74 %** -10.94 %** -6.70 %**
Single mothers -5.98 %*** -1.23 %** -5.19 %*** -5.44 %*** -2.74 %***
** Statistically significant at 5%. *** Statistically significant at 1%.
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